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The Power of the Weak1 
Martin Gargiulo, INSEAD 
Gokhan Ertug, Singapore Management University 
Abstract 
Weak organizational actors can overcome the consequences of their dependence by securing the 
control of valuable resources or by embedding dependence relationships into social networks. While 
these strategies may not eliminate the underlying dependence, they can curtail the ability or the 
willingness of the stronger party to use power. Embedding strategies, however, can also have 
unintended consequences. Because the network structures that confer power to the weak are 
inherently more stable, they can persist beyond the point of being beneficial, trapping weak actors into 
unsuitable network structures. The power of the weak can thus become the weakness of the strong.  
Published in Contemporary Perspectives on Organizational Social Networks (pp. 179 - 198). 2014. Bingley: 
Emerald. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/S0733-558X(2014)0000040009  
 
Introduction 
The hierarchical nature of formal organizations results in unequal distribution of power among its 
members. Positions in the formal hierarchy typically grant and legitimate decision rights on resources and 
people (Thompson 1967; Perrow 1970). These rights, in turn, translate into asymmetric dependence 
relationships whose formation is mostly beyond the control of the organizational members, and definitively 
beyond the control of the weaker parties in these relationships. While the distribution of power in 
organizations does not perfectly match the pattern of the formal hierarchy, formal position typically remains 
the strongest predictor of power (Fombrun 1983; Krackhardt 1990), creating dependence situations that are 
difficult to escape or overturn. 
Power differences do not necessarily curtail the ability of weaker organizational members to pursue 
their goals, but they may certainly do so. Even in cases where powerful parties do not purposively use their 
power over weaker organizational members, the latter typically face more difficulties in accessing the 
resources and information required to excel at their jobs, which can jeopardize their performance and career 
                                                     
1 We thank Prof. Kathy Eisenhardt for suggesting the title for this essay. 
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progression (Gargiulo, Ertug, and Galunic 2009). Members in low-power positions may lack the legitimacy to 
pursue initiatives that can help them move up into more favourable positions. This is especially the case in 
knowledge intensive organizations. To do their jobs well, knowledge workers need to secure voluntary help 
from colleagues throughout the organization. Yet, not all weaker parties are equally powerless in securing 
such help. Rather, some actors are able to develop alternatives to revert or to attenuate the negative 
consequences of being the weaker party in a dependence situation.  
Although understanding how relatively powerless members of organizations cope with their 
dependence should be an important concern of organizational scholars, this topic has received comparatively 
little attention since it was introduced by Mechanic (1962) half a century ago. The relative neglect of the 
“power of the weak” as a topic of research among organizational theorists contrasts with the vast literature on 
power, spanning from the extensive experimental work within exchange theory (Emerson 1962; Cook and 
Emerson 1978; see Willer 1999 for an overview of more recent work) to the tradition championed by Jeffrey 
Pfeffer among organizational scholars (Pfeffer 1981; Pfeffer and Salancik 1974).  
Concern with power in organizations has also been prominent in social network analysis. The seminal 
paper by Brass (1984) focused on the study of power as a structural phenomenon and opened the way to 
further studies of how the position an actor occupies in the informal network structure of the organization sets 
constraints and opportunities to acquire power. The kernel of this research has been to show how power 
accrues to people in more “central” network positions, which are expected to provide superior access to (and 
sometimes control over) information flows in the organization (Brass 1984; 1985; Ibarra 1993; see Brass and 
Krackhardt 2012 for a review). This tradition has also stressed the importance of ties with powerful parties as 
a source of power, these being members of the dominant coalition (e.g., Brass 1984, 1985) or, more generally, 
people who occupy senior leadership roles in the firm (Sparrowe and Liden 2005; Galunic, Ertug, and 
Gargiulo, 2012).  
Although network scholars often acknowledge that the potential advantages of a structural position 
must be coupled with agency for such advantages to be consequential (e.g., Brass and Burkhardt 1993), their 
emphasis on the structural aspects of power typically leaves agency as an implicit, if not neglected, dimension 
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of the study. Agency is also implicit in attempts to bring individual cognition back into the structural 
perspective that dominates network analysis (e.g., Kilduff and Krackhardt 1994; Krackhardt 1990). The 
cognitive perspective stresses how the individual perception of relationships can be at times more important 
than the actual ties are in determining outcomes associated with power. This, in turn, suggests that successful 
attempts at managing perceptions may be consequential in shaping the behavior of other parties, even as the 
actual social relationships remain unchanged. Yet, the agency implications of this approach, such as when and 
how actors would engage in such impression management activities (as compared to attempting to change 
actual ties or doing nothing), remain largely unexplored.  
A focus on agency is particularly important for the phenomenon that is central to this paper—namely, 
how weaker organizational players may manage to overcome their weakness or, at least, mitigate the 
potentially detrimental consequences of such weakness. Given that weak actors are likely to face stronger 
constraints on their action, studying when and how such actors exert agency to overcome their weakness is 
critical to better understanding the power of the weak from a network analytical perspective. An earlier 
research tradition grounded in fieldwork observation has identified a number of “upward influence tactics” 
weaker parties may use to gain leverage on the powerful (e.g., Kipnis and Schmidt 1988; Krone 1992; 
Mainiero 1986; see Schilit and Locke 1982, for a review of the earlier literature). However, the inductive 
nature of this work makes it difficult to link it to the systematic approach to theory building that has 
characterized the network analytical tradition (but see Brass and Burkhardt 1993, for an exception). While we 
will not undertake a review of this extensive literature in this essay, we will refer to it in our discussion of how 
weak actors can build social ties to attenuate the negative consequences of their dependence. 
Despite this apparent neglect, scholars have made a number of important theoretical contributions that 
can shed light on how weaker organizational members who cannot escape a dependence relationship might 
engage in agency efforts to cope with this dependence. Such efforts can be exercised through two routes: 
weak parties may seek to rebalance their dependence by securing control of resources that are critical to the 
powerful parties, or they may try changing the social structure around the dependence relationship to attenuate 
the consequences of their dependence. These two ways are grounded in two complementary—and often 
intertwined—theoretical traditions on the study of power. The first tradition has been inspired by exchange 
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(Emerson 1962, Blau 1964; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and contingency (Crozier 1964; Hickson et al. 1971; 
Hinings et al. 1974; Thompson 1967) theories of organizational power. The second tradition, more directly 
linked to network analysis, has focused on the reputational and normative pressures associated with social ties 
in general (Granovetter, 1985) and with closely-knit networks or “network closure” in particular (Coleman 
1990). Weak parties who cannot accumulate valuable resources to balance their dependence relationship may 
seek to embed this relationship within social ties that could restrain the use of power by the strong party, 
attenuating the negative effects of their dependence (Gargiulo 1993).  
Embedding dependence relationships into social ties that could restrain the use of power by the 
stronger party is not without costs for the weaker party, however. Specifically, research has shown that while 
network closure can help organizational members in lower positions within the hierarchy of the firm, it can 
also hurt them once they move out of these to higher positions (Gargiulo, Ertug and Galunic 2009). This 
situation poses an interesting challenge for weak organizational members and a puzzle for scholars studying 
power dynamics in organizations. If embedded ties can help weak organizational members to alleviate the 
negative consequences of their dependence, but these same ties become a liability once they have overcome 
their original dependence situation, employees may have to extricate themselves from the same social ties that 
helped them surmount their weakness. 
This essay provides an overview of the two routes through which weaker organizational actors can 
engage in agency efforts to overcome the potentially detrimental consequences of their weakness: securing the 
control of valuable resources and embedding dependence into social networks. We then explore the 
unintended consequences of successful agency efforts on the subsequent ability of these weak actors to gain 
influence in the organization. We argue that, because the network structures that can confer power to the weak 
are inherently more stable, they can very well persist beyond the point of being beneficial for the weaker 
players, trapping them into situations that can be detrimental for their ability to further their careers and 
influence in the organization. 
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Securing the control of valuable resources 
In his seminal paper on power-dependence relationships, Emerson (1962) identified four different 
“balancing operations” through which the weaker party might seek to reduce his or her dependence on the 
stronger party. According to Emerson (1962: 35-37), the weaker party may reduce this dependence by (1) 
doing without the stronger party; (2) cultivating alternatives to the stronger party; (3) increasing the 
dependence of the stronger party; and (4) preventing the stronger party from having alternatives. The first 
balancing operation is seldom available to weak actors in organizations, where dependence largely results 
from the distribution of resources and decision rights ingrained in the formal structure. More often than not, to 
do without the resources or information controlled by the stronger party the weaker player would need to find 
an alternative job in the organization, which is likely to bring its own separate set of dependence relationships, 
or to quit the organization altogether.  
Although more feasible than the first, the second balancing operation—cultivating alternatives—is 
also rarely available to weak actors in formal organizational settings. The structural underpinnings of the 
second of Emerson’s balancing operations have been investigated in experimental settings by David Willer 
and his collaborators (see Willer 1999: 108-126 for a summary). In a series of studies, these researchers 
identify network structures that generate what they dubbed “weak power”—that is, network structures where 
the distribution of power falls between the high power asymmetry found in “strong” power structures and the 
equal distribution of power found in networks where all actors have the same exchange opportunities. In 
essence, weak power network structures attenuate the differences in the distribution of power among actors by 
adding exchange alternatives for the weaker players in a “strong power” network. In organizational settings, 
the creation of alternatives—such as internal or external job opportunities—can confer power to subordinates 
who are willing to leverage such alternatives by threatening to leave the organization or the unit, especially if 
these subordinates are not easily replaceable (Johnson and Ford 1996). Yet, Cotton (1976) found that 
Emerson’s third and fourth balancing operations are the two most frequently used by actors in low-power 
situations, which is consistent with our observation that first two are rarely available to weak organizational 
members. 
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Emerson’s third balancing operation—increasing the dependence of the stronger party—is related to 
the control of resources or processes by the weaker player. Because power accrues to those who control 
valuable resources or critical contingencies in the organization (Crozier 1964; Salancik and Pfeffer 1978; 
Hickson et al. 1971; Hinings et al. 1974; Thompson 1967), weaker actors who manage to establish and to 
leverage such control can increase their power. A well-known example is that of the maintenance workers in 
Crozier's (1964) classic study of a tobacco factory in France: by preventing others from accessing their 
knowledge of how to maintain critical machinery, the workers created dependencies that boosted their power 
in the organization. Blackburn (1981) offers a comprehensive argument of how “lower participants” can 
amass power by controlling critical organizational contingencies, whereas Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) 
provide a summary of findings with a focus on applications to multinational corporations. 
Organizational change can create opportunities for weak actors to increase their control of critical 
resources, augmenting their influence in the organization. Studying the effects of the introduction of a 
computerized information system on the informal power structure of an organization, Burkhardt and Brass 
(1990) found that organizational players who were early adopters of the new technology increased their power 
and centrality more than late adopters did. Because early adopters were more likely to be low in power before 
the change, the adoption pattern resulted in a redistribution of informal power in the organization. While 
actors who were powerful before the change remained powerful, the increased centrality of the early adopters 
augmented their informal power and reduced their dependence situation in the organization.  
Strategies for rebalancing dependence in favor of the weak party by increasing the control of 
important resources and information needed by the strong party can be implemented without the active 
cooperation or the permission of the strong party. Indeed, such strategies are more likely to succeed if they 
remain unnoticed until the weak party has amassed sufficient control over the specific resources to rebalance 
the dependence, especially if the employed strategies are not perceived as entirely legitimate. The managers 
described by Crozier (1964) in his classic study did not condone the actions of the maintenance workers but 
could not keep the machinery running without their expert knowledge. Other rebalancing strategies, however, 
such as coalitions or co-optation, require the collaboration (or at least, the acquiescence) of other actors 
(Casciaro and Piskorski 2005). As we will argue below, the need to enlist the collaboration of other parties to 
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rebalance the dependence relationship in favor of the weaker party is essential to distinguish strategies that 
rely on the accumulation of resources needed by the powerful party from strategies that seek to affect the 
ability or willingness of the powerful party to exercise power. We discuss the strategies in this latter group as 
embedding strategies. 
Embedding dependence into social networks  
Whenever feasible, agency efforts that increase the control of critical resources or information by 
weak players are an effective way to rebalance dependence. An alternative route to attenuate the negative 
effects of dependence is to affect the network structure in which the dependence relationship exists in ways 
that end up reducing the use of power by the strong party. This is the essence of embedding strategies. Such 
strategies can be classified based on the relationship of the parties involved in their implementation. Direct 
embedding strategies seek to build a social relationship between the weak and the strong party, whereas 
indirect strategies try to enlist the presence of third parties. In some cases, the third parties are structurally 
equivalent to the focal weak player, in the sense that they are also dependent on the strong party. Such a 
situation leads to the formation of coalitions through which the weaker actors effectively coordinate their 
behavior to prevent the strong party from exploiting their lack of coordination to maintain his or her power. In 
other cases, the third party is someone who has power over the strong party, as exemplified by influence 
tactics based on appealing to higher authority. These second type of indirect embedding strategies were 
discussed as “two-step” maneuvers by Gargiulo (1993), who views them as an extension of the direct 
embedding maneuver that is central in resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  
From a theoretical viewpoint, it is important to distinguish embedding strategies from changes in the 
structure of the exchange network that modify the number of exchange alternatives available to actors, 
creating the “weak power” networks discussed before (Willer 1999). Unlike weak power network structures, 
embedding strategies do not generate alternatives to the dependence relationship for the weaker party, nor do 
they alter the substance of this dependence. Rather, embedding strategies are about building ties around the 
dependence relationship in ways that curtail the willingness or the ability of the strong party to use power. In 
some cases, such as the formation of coalitions, embedding strategies reduce the alternatives effectively 
available to the strong party by coordinating the actors who could supply the resources needed by the strong 
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party. Indeed, this is what ultimately accounts for the power of the maintenance workers in Crozier’s (1964) 
classic study, or the power of cartels such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
in the global economy. This, however, is fundamentally different from eliminating exchange alternatives for 
the strong party by monopolizing resources, because a weakening of the bonds that keep the coalition together 
would reinstate the excluded alternatives, reverting to the power asymmetry situation that existed before the 
coalition was in place. 
Direct embedding strategies build a new social relationship between the weak and the strong parties in 
a dependence relationship in a way that curtails the ability or the willingness of the strong party to use his or 
her power advantage over the weaker actor. This is the quintessential cooptation maneuver that is at the core 
of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; see Selznick 1949 for an earlier formulation). At 
the intra-organizational level, this strategy results in maneuvers such as inviting a member who opposes a 
certain policy initiative to a task force responsible for analyzing the viability of the initiative, conveniently 
staffed with supporters; or the embedding of a personal relationship with the powerful party through the 
promotion of interpersonal attraction or ingratiation described in some studies (Mechanic 1962; Kipnis and 
Vanderveer 1971; Wortman and Linsenmeier 1977; Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson 1980). Reasoning from a 
different framework, Sparrowe and Liden (2005) also extol the benefits weaker organizational players can 
derive from having a trusting relationship with stronger parties. They show that the dependent party in a 
hierarchical dyad can benefit from having a trusting relationship with the superior, which can help them 
overcome the lack of legitimacy (and its detrimental consequences for accessing resources and information) 
often associated with weak organizational actors.  
Direct embedding strategies seek to increase the personal interest of the stronger party on the weaker 
one. When successful, the strategy would make the stronger party less likely to use his or her power over the 
weaker one, and it may even lead him or her to actively help the weaker player, as documented by Sparrowe 
and Liden (2005) in their study of leader-subordinate dyads. As such, it could be argued that direct embedding 
strategies fall within Emerson’s (1962) second group of rebalancing operations, since these maneuvers seem 
to increase the dependence of the stronger party. However, two elements distinguish direct embedding from 
rebalancing operations based on the control of critical resources discussed before. First, successful embedding 
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strategies require the cooperation of the strong party, who should yield to, or agree with, the weak party’s 
attempts to build a social relationship. This is clearly not the case with strategies aimed at increasing one’s 
control of resources needed by the strong party. While in some cases the success of such strategies is made 
possible by the negligence of the strong party, the most likely scenario is one where the increase in the control 
of resources by the weak party goes unnoticed until its rebalancing effects are apparent. Second, while the 
strong party may derive some benefits from the embedded relationship, the nature of this exchange is 
substantially different from the exchange that ensues after a rebalancing operation where the weak player has 
managed to control critical resources needed by the strong party. The strong party may enjoy the deference 
provided by the weak one, but she could always decide to do without this deference and use her power. 
However, the option of doing without the critical resources the weaker party has come to control as a result of 
a successful rebalancing operation may not be feasible for the stronger player.  
Indirect embedding strategies were not contemplated in Emerson’s (1962) original article or in 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Though implicit in some of the tactics described in 
the literature, such as appealing to people higher up in the authority chain (Weinstein 1979; Kipnis et al. 
1980), systematic theorizing on indirect embedding was introduced by Gargiulo (1993) as an extension of 
resource dependence theory. He argued that the weak party in a dependence relationship may attenuate the 
negative effects of this dependence by building a new social tie with a third party who has power over the 
strong party—that is, someone who is two steps away from the weak player in the dependence network. While 
such indirect upward influence tactics are rare (Schilit and Locke 1982), Gargiulo (1993) showed that the 
weak party is significantly more likely to engage in indirect (or “two-step”) embedding maneuvers when a 
dependence relationship has gone sour. Indirect embedding should make the strong party more likely to 
refrain from using his power, out of concern with the effect that this behavior might have on his or her 
dependence relationship with the third party brought into the picture by the maneuver of the weak player. 
More generally, indirect embedding exploits the controlling properties of network closure (Coleman 
1988, 1990). Ties to actors whom the strong party depends on create pressures that can prevent this strong 
party from fully using power in her dealings with the weak party. This restraint can manifest itself in a number 
of ways, from avoiding using power to impose demands on the weak party to helping the weak party even 
10 
 
though the strong player would have preferred to do otherwise. It is worth noting that indirect embedding does 
not require the active intervention of the common third parties to be effective: the sole knowledge that a 
person who depends on me is close to people I depend upon should suffice to make it less likely for me to use 
my power on that person. Moreover, one could argue that the mere perception that such a tie exists, even 
when this is not the case, should suffice to restrain the use of power (Kilduff and Krackhardt 1994). Weaker 
parties can therefore cultivate ties with people who have power on the person they depend upon, or manage to 
create the impression that they do have such ties, to gain some leverage. Of course, the continuing 
effectiveness of an impression management approach depends on the inability or unwillingness of the 
powerful party to corroborate the existence of the constraining embedded tie.  
Systematic evidence on the effectiveness of indirect embedding comes from both inter-organizational 
and interpersonal networks. At the inter-organizational level, Bae and Gargiulo (2005) showed that 
organizations that enter alliances with powerful partners are better off if the alliance is embedded in common 
third parties. At the interpersonal level, Gargiulo, Ertug, and Galunic (2009) show that investment bankers 
who rely on a dense network of contacts to obtain the information and support needed to do their work 
perform better than those who rely on a sparse network. The benefits of dense networks is particularly 
noticeable for “weak” organizational members, such as junior bankers or those who have been passed over for 
promotion, who presumably lack alternative means to secure the cooperation of other colleagues (and 
especially, of senior colleagues) in the organization. In a similar vein, Burt (1992) showed that “illegitimate” 
organizational members (such as minorities or entry-level employees) were better off when they could secure 
a tie to a powerful mentor other than the direct supervisor. 
A third and less obvious form of embedding is the formation of a coalition. There is a vast literature 
on political coalitions spanning the fields of political science (Riker 1962; Hinckley 1981), social psychology 
(Gamson 1961, 1964; Caplow 1956, 1968), and game theory (Luce and Raiffa 1957; Shubik 1964). Coalitions 
are also central to March and Simon’s (1958) classic book on organization theory and to the behavioral theory 
of the firm (Cyert and March 1963). The literature on influence tactics documents the use of coalitions to 
enhance the power of the weak in organizational settings (Mechanic 1962; Weinstein 1979; Kipnis, Schmidt, 
and Wilkinson 1980), especially in cases of lateral or upward influence attempts (Yukl and Tracey 1992).  
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In its essence, a coalition is a successful attempt to organize structurally equivalent weak parties to 
restrict the alternatives of the strong party by agreeing on the conditions of their dealings with this party. In 
this sense, it differs from the standard two-step embedding maneuver in that coalitions typically involve other 
weak players, whereas a successful two-step maneuver engages parties that are as powerful or more than the 
player it intends to restrain. While the common interest of the weak parties should make coalitions feasible, 
the higher costs of coordinating a large number of actors make coalitions harder to create and maintain. The 
bonds that link coalition members allow them to control the supply of the resources needed by the strong 
party, but their effectiveness depends on the successful ongoing coordination of its members, which is 
conditional on the persistence of the bonds between its members.  
The unintended consequences of embedding strategies 
Embedding strategies can alleviate the negative consequences of dependence for weak parties by 
relying on the power of direct and indirect social bonds to curtail the ability or the willingness of the strong 
party to take advantage of his or her power. Yet agency is not without costs. Because they rely on the creation 
of new social bonds, both direct and indirect embedding strategies have unintended consequences that may 
incur costs for the weak party. Moreover, these costs may become more apparent with changes in the original 
power-dependence relationship. The unintended consequences of agency present some interesting puzzles and 
suggest various fruitful avenues for future research on the power of weak organizational members. 
Accordingly, in this section we examine the unintended consequences of embedding strategies to cope with 
dependence, and formulate several propositions that identify avenues for future research on the power of the 
weak and the dynamics of power in intra-organizational networks. 
The unintended consequences of embedding stem from properties that are intrinsic to social 
relationships. First, social bonds create mutual obligations that may persist beyond the situation that originally 
resulted in these bonds. Because reciprocation in social exchanges is inherently ambiguous (Leifer 1988; 
Coleman 1990: 306), the obligations created by social bonds may persist even after these bonds are no longer 
beneficial—or have even become harmful—for the weak party. Second, social bonds may serve as filters for 
the information reaching the weak actors, prompting a “cognitive lock-in” (Grabher 1993; Johnson, Bellman 
and Lohse 2003) that isolates them from the broader environment and may confer a distorted view of the 
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world (Uzzi 1997). Third, social bonds—and especially those embedded in common third parties—create 
feelings of familiarity and comfort that can prevent actors from expanding their networks when necessary. 
The ease of cooperation with familiar partners, and the uncertainty associated with the formation of new ties, 
may make actors less likely to initiate and consolidate new relationships, leaving actors “trapped in their own 
net” (Gargiulo and Benassi 2000). 
Evidence supporting the unintended consequences of embedding comes from a variety of studies of 
interpersonal relationships in organizational and other contexts. Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) describe 
how ethnic entrepreneurs often get suffocated by the particularistic demands posed by members of the 
cohesive ethnic group that facilitated the entrepreneurs’ success. Junior bankers benefit from relying on a 
cohesive set of contacts for obtaining information and support, but these benefits disappear as bankers move 
up the ranks (Gargiulo, Ertug and Galunic 2009). Managers embedded in a closely-knit social network are less 
likely to develop new relationships required by the changing nature of their tasks (Gargiulo and Benassi 
2000). Weak organizational members can benefit from embedding their dependence relationships in direct or 
indirect social bonds that help them mitigate the negative consequences of their lack of power, but these same 
bonds may become a liability as these same members accumulate resources or alternatives that change their 
initial dependence situation.  
If embedding may become a trap once weak actors have managed to overcome the root causes of their 
weakness, understanding what factors may make it more or less difficult for them to extricate themselves from 
embedded relationships can help us understand how actors can subsequently escape the unintended 
consequences of embedding strategies. This is not straightforward, for it may involve factors that go beyond 
the realm of network structures, although these other factors might also be influenced by network structures. 
Embedded relationships often give rise to sentiments of collective identity and loyalty that create strong 
emotional bonds and a sense of obligation towards the person or the “community,” which would render it 
more difficult for actors to move beyond those bonds (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). Such sentiments may 
curtail the ability of an actor to expand her network even in the absence of overt pressures from members of 
the embedded group. Although we acknowledge these difficulties, which are likely to be context-specific, our 
focus will be on the structural factors that are likely to make it harder for actors to escape the embedding trap. 
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Escaping the trap of embedded relationships essentially requires weakening the strength of these 
relationships to levels that allow the actor to expand the network beyond those embedded ties. Although the 
strength of social bonds varies naturally over time (Granovetter 1973), the extent of such variation depends on 
factors that might, at least in some cases, be under the weak actor’s control and hence should be considered at 
the time of devising embedding strategies to cope with dependence situations. Research on social networks 
suggests that the frequency, duration, and emotional closeness of the relationship contribute to tie strength 
(Granovetter 1973; Marsden and Campbell 1984). Other factors include homophily and multiplexity. 
Homophily is the tendency to build ties with similar others (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001), 
whereas multiplexity refers to having multiple kinds of relationships with the same party (Kapferer 1969). 
Physical distance is probably one of the most potent factors that can affect the strength of ties. 
Community studies have shown that distance is strongly correlated with the frequency of interaction, which in 
turn is a key element in the emergence and the reproduction of strong ties (Campbell 1990). Although new 
technologies make it easier for people to maintain contact, a career move that prompts a change of location 
can weaken social bonds, as the mover will have fewer spontaneous opportunities to interact with previous 
associates. Since research shows that physical proximity affects the likelihood of formation and intensity of 
interactions, changes in the physical location of people affect interaction patterns (Borgatti and Cross 2003; 
Marmaros and Sacerdote 2006). The counter-example is illustrated by the managers studied by Gargiulo and 
Benassi (2000): physical proximity made it possible for some managers to maintain their strong ties with 
members of their original groups, even to the extent of making it less likely that they would build necessary 
working relationships with the new members of their unit.  
While increasing the physical distance between a manager and her old contacts may be an effective 
way to loosen the grip of a cohesive network, this option may not be available. Therefore, it becomes 
important to consider other factors that make relationships stickier. Three such factors are homophily, 
multiplexity, and network closure—that is, the tendency to embed relationships in common third parties. 
Homophily should make it easier for weak organizational actors to establish relationships that might help 
them cope with dependence (Ertug and Gargiulo 2012). At the same time, homophilous ties may be more 
difficult to weaken, especially when the shared trait is culturally salient, like being member of a minority that 
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is (or perceives to be) discriminated by the majority (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). Such ties are likely to 
be associated with a sense of identity and obligations to the “community” that are difficult to escape. Hence, 
we propose that the higher an actor’s tendency to rely on homophilous ties to alleviate a dependence situation, 
the lower the actor’s ability to renew his or her network once the dependence situation is no longer 
consequential. Moreover, we also expect that this inertial effect of homophilous ties will be stronger when 
homophily is grounded in culturally coded categories that identify minority groups that are perceived as 
disadvantaged in the context of the organization. 
Multiplexity is the essence of relational embeddedness (Granovetter 1992), so weak actors who seek 
to alleviate their dependence by embedding a second, typically more personal relationship with the powerful 
party cannot escape multiplexity. Yet, an embedding strategy that is mindful of the “dark side” of such ties 
should try to avoid expanding multiplexity beyond what is necessary to influence the strong party’s 
willingness to use his or her power. This is particularly relevant for ingratiation tactics that seek to build an 
emotional bond with the stronger player to attenuate dependence (Mechanic 1962; Kipnis and Vanderveer 
1971; Kipnis et al. 1980). If not carefully monitored, such bonds are likely to expand into strong multiplex 
relationships that may not be easy to weaken once their importance for the weaker party wanes. The difficulty 
may result both from pressures to continue the embedded relationship by alter as well as from a sense of 
obligation in ego, as engrained in the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960). Thus, the embedded relationship 
may become a liability that hinders the ability of the weak actor to adapt her social network in later stages of 
her career (Higgins and Nohria 1999). Therefore, we propose that the higher an actor’s tendency to construct 
multiplex relationships with their source of dependence, the lower the actor’s ability to renew his or her 
network once the dependence situation is no longer consequential. 
Similar considerations apply to indirect embedding strategies that exploit the control properties of 
network closure to mitigate the negative consequences of dependence. Ties in a closely-knit network are 
typically stronger and more resilient to decay (Krackhardt 1998; Burt 2007), and hence we expect that they 
will be less likely to weaken once the dependence is no longer present. Interaction effects are also important. 
Ties in a social network with high closure will be even stronger if they are also homophilous or multiplex. 
Therefore, we propose that the more embedding strategies based on network closure rely on homophilous or 
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multiplex ties to implement indirect embedding strategies to cope with dependence, the lower will be the 
likelihood of their renewing their networks when they move past beyond that situation. 
While we have viewed homophilous or multiplex relationships as embedded ties that emerge to 
alleviate the consequences of dependence, actors might have also chosen to depend on someone with whom 
they already share a meaningful attribute or have a pre-existing social tie—that is, the social relationship may 
precede the dependence relationship. This situation is more likely to arise in contexts where actors have some 
degree of autonomy in choosing the providers of the resources they need, as might be the case with employees 
in flat, knowledge intensive organizations. Regardless of the causal order behind the observed pattern of 
relationships, networks resulting from embedded strategies that rely on homophilous or multiplex ties are 
likely to be stickier than those that do not. Hence, the validity of our propositions linking homophily, 
multiplexity, and embedding with the network renewal that might be required following changes in the 
dependence situation of the weak party still hold.  
The mechanisms we have invoked so far to explain the unintended consequences of embedding 
strategies for the weaker actors that move to positions with more autonomy in the organization have stressed 
the persisting obligations to the old associates and the relational inertia caused by the familiarity with those 
associates. Yet, there is another, less apparent consequence of embedding strategies, where their negative 
effects may be manifest even if the partciular embedded ties may have naturally waned—for example, as a 
result of physical distance. The effectiveness of embedding strategies in helping weak actors cope with their 
dependence may lead them to continue applying such strategies, despite having moved to positions with 
higher autonomy in the organization, where the negative consequences of network closure are apparent (Burt 
1997; Gargiulo, Ertug and Galunic, 2009; Ertug and Gargiulo 2012). The mechanism behind the persistence 
of prior successful strategies beyond the situation that allowed for their success is akin to the “competence 
trap” associated with suboptimal organizational routines (Levitt and March 1988). Because weaker actors are 
disproportionally represented in entry level ranks in the organization, their early successful experience with 
embedding strategies in coping with their dependence may result in a “networking style” (Vissa 2012) that 
results in a professional network that is too homophilous, too multiplex, or too cohesive to support their 
subsequent senior roles in the organization. While the network that helped the weak actors cope with 
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dependence may not remain, actors might still seek to reproduce the same type of network, with negative 
consequences now for their influence in the organization.  
Conclusion 
Actors occupying dependent positions in organizations can and do resort to a number of strategies to 
alleviate their weakness. While most of these strategies cannot eliminate the underlying asymmetry of 
resources and authority that cause the dependence, they are often effective in helping weak parties survive 
(and sometimes even thrive) despite their dependence. Yet, many strategies that help weaker parties cope with 
dependence also entail costs, which may become more apparent once the beneficiary has moved to positions 
with higher autonomy in the organization. This is especially the case with strategies that rely on embedding 
social ties within or around a dependence relationship to curtail the exercise of power by the stronger party. 
The trade-off between opportunities and constraints that is inherent in social structures naturally applies to the 
strategies weak actors use to cope with their dependence, and it becomes consequential when they fail to 
recognize that the effectiveness of these strategies is largely limited to the context responsible for their 
weakness. 
While it is difficult—when not altogether impossible—to eliminate the costs of embedding strategies, 
actors may seek to attenuate them by avoiding situations that may lead to what Uzzi (1997) suitably labeled as 
“overembeddedness.” In the same way that excessive trust can lead to detrimental outcomes for the trusting 
party (Gargiulo and Ertug 2006), excessive embeddedness in early stages of a career can become a trap that 
prevents organizational actors from continuing to adapt their professional networks. This trade-off is further 
complicated because factors that make it easier to build embedded ties in the first place, such as homophily 
and multiplexity, are the very same factors that make it harder for actors to escape the trap of cohesive 
networks subsequently.  
The dilemma between the benefits and costs of social bonds is not limited to embedded relationships 
in formal organizations: as therapists remind us (e.g. Luepnitz 2002), it is essential to the tension between 
comfort and autonomy present in all relationships involving bonds of interpersonal obligation. Perhaps 
nobody captured the essence of this dilemma better than Arthur Schopenhauer did with the well-known 
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parable of the porcupines on a winter day, which we believe is applicable to social networks in organizational 
contexts and should be kept in mind by weak parties throughout: 
A number of porcupines huddled together for warmth on a cold day in winter; but, as they began to 
prick one another with their quills, they were obliged to disperse. However the cold drove them 
together again, when just the same thing happened. At last, after many turns of huddling and 
dispersing, they discovered that they would be best off by remaining at a little distance from one 
another. 
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